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Abstract
Part I of this Article develops some necessary perspective on transovereignty and its impor-
tance to law and ethics by reflecting first on traditional sovereignty. A few competing positivist
and anti-positivist theories of the emergence of political and legal systems will be briefly reviewed
to reveal significantly different pictures of the possible role played by rights-claims in political de-
velopment. Part II extends one of those theoretical models to help us describe more fully the nature
and importance of the special political phenomenon of transovereignty. Part III examines briefly a
particularly strong example of transovereignty at work: the impact of the Catholic Church on local
political activities in Poland. Widening the Article’s perspective, Part IV speculates briefly on the
implications of transovereignty for the legal ethics of lawyers practicing human rights law. The
Article addresses the question, for example, of whether lawyers as a professional group, with their
shared reverence for the rule of law as a governing political ideal - an ideal of orderliness that they
view as a “human right” all its own - are themselves becoming a significant transovereign force.
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INTRODUCTION
Identifying the legal ethics that should be associated with
international human rights claims is an interesting challenge -
not because the ethics might be murky, but because these rights
until recently have always had such a questionable international
legal status. Claims based on human rights, unlike traditional
international claims, seek to protect individuals rather than
* A version of this Article was delivered as part of a symposium, Lawyers' Ethics
and International Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Professional Detachment and
Moral Anguish, held at Fordham University School of Law on October 20, 1993, under
the auspices of the Stein Institute of Law and Ethics.
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states, and they seek to do so directly rather than derivatively
through the claimant's state.' Despite these features (or per-
haps because of them) many lawyers now profess to "practice" this
non-traditional law, raising in turn the general question of
whether traditional legal ethics ought nevertheless constrain that
practice. This Article will examine that issue by approaching it
in an unusual way. It will first focus on a fundamental assump-
tion behind international law - that states emerge distinct from
the individuals who comprise them - and demonstrate the chal-
lenge presented to that assumption, and hence to our under-
standings of human rights and legal ethics, by a political force
few seem to appreciate: the rise of "transovereignty".
Transovereigns can be summarized as powerful political en-
tities that are less than fully sovereign states, but more than just
the individuals who presently comprise them. Examples would
include the Catholic Church, the environmental "Green" move-
ment, fundamentalist Islam, international communism, and in
many ways the United Nations. As these examples indicate, tran-
sovereigns are not "quasi" or "aspiring" sovereigns - they are
not immature forms of states, developing toward better or more
recognized control over territory and indigenous populations.
They ordinarily do not trouble themselves with the delicate and
difficult task of actually governing - that is, reconciling conflict-
ing interests within diverse populations. Instead, transovereigns
are important today precisely because they are not freighted with
the responsibilities of nationhood.3 They are focused entities,
1. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 59-64, 564-77
(4th ed. 1990); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 330-55
(1991); see also FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
(1990).
2. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 1 at 64-65, 79-80 (discussing "states in statu nas-
cendi" and "insurgent communities").
3. Transovereigns are therefore closely related to, but not the same as, "non-gov-
ernmental organizations" (or NGO's) that have come under careful scrutiny recently.
See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of
International Environmental Law, 68 CmI.-KENr L. REv. 61 (1993); see also David J.
Bederman, The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition's Convention on Antarctic Conserva-
tion: Introduction and Commentary, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 47 (1991) (giving another
example of a complex NGO at work). Our definition of transovereign will require a
more fundamental commitment to an organization's values and agenda than an ordi-
nary NGO would involve. Nevertheless, some organizations that would be labeled as
NGO's will be transovereigns, or one or more NGO's may be more specific or evident
manifestations of a larger transovereign movement. A possible picture of how complex
the interrelationships might be that constitute a transovereign movement at work is
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sometimes with a single purpose, that concentrate their energies
on particular goals without regard for national boundaries.
They have in a sense, then, "transcended" ordinary sovereignty.
Transovereigns are particularly relevant to international
law, therefore, because they separate their claims of human
rights from traditional sovereignty, attempting to root these
rights directly in morality rather than nationality. Furthermore,
transovereigns make significant use of human rights in further-
ing their agendas. The goals of transovereigns are characteristi-
cally expressed as a set of fundamental moral propositions -
"human rights" from the transovereign's perspective - that mo-
tivate the membership to practical political activity. As these
transovereigns increase in international importance, the more
eroded the traditional foundation of international law in state
sovereignty seems to become. In turn, legal ethics - also state-
based because of its current confinement to the pronounce-
ments of national bar associations4 - seems less and less rele-
vant to lawyers who practice on behalf of these entities. Tran-
sovereigns thus help bring into sharper focus not only the issues
of human rights, but the anomalies of international legal ethics.
Part I of this Article develops some necessary perspective on
transovereignty and its importance to law and ethics by reflect-
ing first on traditional sovereignty. A few competing positivist
and anti-positivist theories of the emergence of political and
legal systems will be briefly reviewed to reveal significantly differ-
ent pictures of the possible role played by rights-claims in polit-
ical development. Part II extends one of those theoretical mod-
els to help us describe more fully the nature and importance of
the special political phenomenon of transovereignty. Part III ex-
amines briefly a particularly strong example of transovereignty at
work: the impact of the Catholic Church on local political activi-
ties in Poland. Widening the Article's perspective, Part IV specu-
lates briefly on the implications of transovereignty for the legal
presented in David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability and Partnership: A Model for Advo-
cacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE LJ. 2645 (1991). Our view of tran-
sovereigns also distinguishes them from multinational corporations, which, although
potentially significant in the international arena, nevertheless lack any noteworthy in-
ternal cohesive force other than the pursuit of profit. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 1
at 67-68 (discussing international force of corporations).
4. A recent notable exception is the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY (1988) [hereinafter EC CODE OF CONDUCT]; see John Toulmin, A
Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673 (1992).
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ethics of lawyers practicing human rights law. The Article ad-
dresses the question, for example, of whether lawyers as a profes-
sional group, with-their shared reverence for the rule of law as a
governing political ideal - an ideal of orderliness that they view
as a "human right" all its own - are themselves becoming a sig-
nificant transovereign force.
I. SOVEREIGNTY, RIGHTS, AND POLITICAL THEORY
In its "classic," nineteenth century form, which remains its
most familiar and persistent model, international law needed
nothing more to anchor or explain itself than the existence of
nations with sufficient internal power and control - summa-
rized in the concept of "sovereignty"'5 - to generate obedience
to announced rules.' Because those rules were not limited to
domestic pronouncements, but could include multilateral agree-
ments and recognized international legal principles, nation-
states seemingly brought an international legal "system" into
existence by decree, a system based on the domestic models with
which they were familiar.'
Sovereignty
Rules (domesticState andObed. ience international)
In other words, from the formation of a state would simultane-
ously flow the attributes of sovereignty on the part of govern-
ment and a corresponding submission on the part of the citi-
zenry, together permitting rules of all sorts to be promulgated.
Many theories of political community have been pro-
pounded to supplement this simplistic picture, but this Article
reviews and summarizes only a few to give the necessary perspec-
5. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1 at 78-79, 107-71. This is, of course, a rather general
use of this term which ignores for present purposes the nuances of legitimacy from a
more complete international legal perspective.
6. The fact that international law may be closely tied to "the will of states," does not
mean that it is doomed to a derivative and secondary status. SCHACHTER, supra note 1 at
9. It has certainly shown an ability to take on a life of its own. See id. at 9-15; H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 208-31 (1972).
7. See BROWNLE, supra note 1, at 32-57.
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tive on the emergence of transovereignty. Conveniently avail-
able for this purpose is a well-known "debate" of a sort in a series
of works by three legal theorists, whose focus was primarily on
domestic legal systems, but whose approaches nevertheless trans-
late usefully to the international context. It is appropriate to be-
gin with John Austin,8 not because his approach is especially
commendable, but because of the improvements made to his re-
alist/positivist analysis by H.L.A. Hart.' A modern anti-positivist
perspective is next presented through the criticisms of Professor
Hart offered by Ronald Dworkin.1 ° Each of these theorists can
be conveniently summarized around a few basic factors in vari-
ous combinations and sequences, those summaries illustrating
the disagreements that plague legal and political philosophy.
Viewed from this perspective, transovereignty does not resolve
these disagreements; it may complicate them further.
A. Austin
Austin's realism put power and control - more specifically,
orders backed by threats - at the origin of the analysis of legal
systems, with nationhood and obedience following together: 11
WS tate
Sovereignty.I'-*4 Obedience
An understanding of law .(and hence legal ethics) from Austin's
perspective must begin with the simple fact of social control,
which later develops into. legitimate control when power is exer-
cised by an organized government over an obedient popula-
tion. 2 This depiction is so simplistic, however, that little can be
8. JOHN AUSTIN, The Province ofJurisprudence Determined, in I LECTURES ONJURISPRU-
DENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITVE LAW (Murray ed., 1885) [hereinafter LECTURES
ONJURISPRUDENCE];JOHN AUSTIN, Lectures on the Philosophy of Positive Law, in I LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE (Murray ed., 1885).
9. HART, supra note 6.
10. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
11. See generally LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, Lectures I, IV, V, VI, The
Province of Jurisprudence Determined, at 79-103, 140-338; LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 8, Lectures XXII, XXIII, Analysis of Pervading Notions, at 443-57.
.12. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, Lecture VI, The Province of Jurispru-
dence Determined, at 219-338.
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said in its defense, except to repair it somewhat by adding factors
it seems to assume at both ends. For example, something must
motivate people in the first place to organize toward a powerful
government, and something must result from the creation of a
state with an obedient population. Thus, a more complete pic-
ture might include a "need to organize" at the beginning, and, at
the end, a set of practical, governing outcomes that demonstrate
that a viable political entity has been established:
need to ,-State promulgated rules
organize- -- *Obedience ...-- W(duties and rights)
B. Hart
Professor Hart's famous response to this model was not so
much to reorganize it as to add sociological depth and sophisti-
cation to it. For example, he replaced Austin's heavy-handed ap-
proach to sovereignty (consisting merely of control through raw
power) with a version based on a more complex, special kind of
community that had developed within itself, in effect, a respect
for itself. 3 Hart identified this socio-psychological phenomenon
as an "internal point of view," in which the group's members
internalize the community's basic social rules as legitimate
guides to their behavior. 4 This represents a critical step, since
social rules in this kind of community are not merely acquiesced
to as a means of avoiding punishment or reprisal. Instead, they
are accepted by the population as authoritative of the morally cor-
rect thing to do.'5
Hart then suggests, consistent with the basic Austinian
model on which he is building, that within this community, two
further developments can now take place together. One step in-
volves the emergence of a "state," better understood from Hart's
perspective as the formation of an effective government:16 The
social rules that have arisen thus far are made more efficient and
effective through another layer of rules Hart called "secondary
13. See generally HART, supra note 6 at 83-86 (setting forth Hart's concept of law).
14. HART, supra note 6, at 86-88.
15. Id. at 87-88, 99-100.
16. Id. at 91-96.
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rules,"17 or the constitutive social rules of government."8 Be-
cause of the internal point of view from which they spring, how-
ever, these rules form a government that speaks with the degree
of "authority" that all regimes hope to achieve - influence that
does not depend upon coercion or raw power, but a deeper ac-
ceptance by the population. The other development in this
community, then, is the simultaneous evolution within the popu-
lace of that deeper, "internal" feeling of connection to the sys-
tem of rules now being formulated. As Hart puts it, people do
not believe they are simply "obliged" to follow these rules in or-
der to avoid punishment, as in Austin's view; they are instead
motivated by a stronger sense of "obligation" as citizens to obey
them.19
From this combination of government and justified obedi-
ence could then emerge legitimate political authority, and in
turn legal rules that could embody the community's moral and
political values. A summary depiction of his analysis could look
like this:
government
Ifthrough
t 'secondary
sovereignty rues. moral and
need to _ through rules" legitimate moral a
auptitialvluy
organize "internal authority ("rights")
point of view" "obligation /
to obey
Note, however, that Hart left intact Austin's basic order of
events. Hart posited that communities would form because of
the pragmatic needs of personal and social survival, not because
of any key moral imperatives."0 To the extent morality played a
role in the development of this political community, it would be
as an outcome of other, previous psychological and sociological
17. Id. at 91.
18. Id. at 91-96.
19. Id. at 79-88, 96, 99-100.
20. See HART, supra note 6, at 151-207 (discussing necessary distinction between
morals and law in the two chapters of THE CONCEPr OF LAw that he devotes to the
topic). The only concession he makes to the possibility of some content to the concept
of pre-existing "natural law" is his list of five "truisms" concerning human circumstances
in general (such as "human vulnerability") that make a few basic tenets of law (such as
prohibitions against murder) pragmatically inevitable in any society. Id. at 189-95.
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forces of much more immediate and practical import. Author-
ity, therefore, in Hart's political community would be estab-
lished before the identification of the community's moral and
political values, other than the basic pragmatic values necessary
for social survival." "Rights" would also then be a possible, but
not a necessay, product of the exercise of that authority.
C. Dworkin
Although difficult to define precisely on some of these
points, Ronald Dworkin2 2 has developed an anti-positivist cri-
tique of Hart that suggests an important reordering of portions
of the Austin-Hart model of political/legal development. This
reordering is necessary to understanding the nature and signifi-
cance of transovereignty. Professor Dworkin challenges us to im-
agine that practical political development could be preceded and
indeed prompted by moral and political values, and hence by a
commitment to some version of "rights." 23 Rather than being
merely the outcome or product of government, these values or
rights could put philosophy rather than, say, sociology, at or very
near the head of the sequence, and correspondingly make the
outcome of the process a fully legitimated obligation to obey the
rules promulgated by this system:
"Sovereignty"
moral and ,%rthrough internal
political need to / point of view legitimate
values "'0-organize political --.... obligation
("rights") government / authority to obey
through
secondary rules
It is unclear, however, whether Professor Dworkin's fully de-
tailed theory would imagine the origin of national development
to be rooted in concern about values and rights, or whether the
theory begins more mundanely and sociologically in a need to
21. Id. at 189-95 (discussing values arising from "truisms" of the human condi-
tion).
22. See generally TAJUNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 10 (concerning Professor
Dworkin's approach as a whole to political and legal theory rather than specific, iso-
lated sections).
23. Id. at 82-130.
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survive physically rather than morally.24 But for present pur-
poses, that detail is not critical since it is at least clear that Dwor-
kin imagines that values will, and certainly should, matter within
political entities much earlier and more fundamentally than
either Austin or Hart had suggested. If values do precede, and
indeed initiate, every other step in developing legitimate govern-
ment, then Dworkin can be understood as an example of a clas-
sic natural law theorist. If, on the other hand, the values develop
later in the process once the group has some sense of itself -
perhaps even after some preliminary efforts at government have
been attempted - then Dworkin may not be so easily labeled.
Nevertheless, his alternative view of the significance of
moral and political values is important to the alternative view of
international human rights being developed here in relation to
the phenomenon of transovereignty. Assuming for the moment
the more extreme interpretation of Dworkin that posits some set
of basic values or a preliminary sense of rights as initiating the
process of political development, then the people in this com-
munity committed to these values or rights are nonetheless con-
fronted immediately with the pragmatic need to organize them-
selves in order to protect or effectuate those rights. The moral
values in the background of this social group, however, allow it
quickly to become both the social community Hart envisioned
24. Id. Professor Dworkin's so-called "rights thesis," which is at the core of the
analysis of law and legal systems, imposes on judges an ambitious responsibility to deter-
mine the rights of parties in litigation in "hard cases" by reference to a community's
fundamental political morality. Id. Note, for example, the following passages:
Individuals have a right to the consistent enforcement of the principles upon
which their institutions rely. It is this institutional right, as defined by the
community's constitutional morality, that [the judge] must defend against any
inconsistent opinion however popular.
Id. at 126. And in the next paragraph:
[The judge's] theory identifies a particular conception of community morality
as decisive of legal issues; that conception holds that community morality is
the political morality presupposed by the laws and institutions of the commu-
nity.
Id. These and other arguments in the book sometimes seem to suggest that a few fun-
damental moral principles preceded the formation of community and provided the
core around which the community's "laws and institutions" could then form-for in-
stance, where Professor Dworkin discusses the foundational moral values of "human
dignity" and "political equality." See, e.g., id. at 198-99. At other times, however, Profes-
sor Dworkin seems to say that the community simply formed itself, one way or another,
and the judge's job is then to examine those actual historical roots carefully, even if that
endeavor yields morally painful results. See, e.g., id. at 326-27.
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(with the necessary, legitimating "internal point of view" about
basic social values) as well as the political community he had in
mind (with the establishment of a set of secondary rules that will
govern the community).
But there now appears another subtle, and again very im-
portant, difference between the models of political development
suggested by Hart and Dworkin. While Hart seemed to imagine
that the "internal point of view" necessarily entailed a fully real-
ized "obligation to obey" the rules of an established political
community, Dworkin seems to reserve this powerful idea of
moral obligation until later. Dworkin suggests that while the in-
ternal point of view and governmental secondary rules may gen-
erate legitimate political authority to govern, the population be-
ing governed in this model will only have an obligation to obey
in the strong sense once the edicts of this government are criti-
cally compared to the moral and political values that started the
enterprise.25 In other words, if the values that lie behind this
political community are to be taken seriously, then the popula-
tion's fully internalized obligation to obey the rules of the gov-
ernment will only be established when the rules are shown to
manifest those background values. Thus, the obligation to obey
seems more a product of these steps than a factor that is itself
initially helping to establish the community's government. Polit-
ical authority in its fullest sense, then, under this understanding
of Dworkin's approach, is established by the combination of a
value-based community and a morally purposeful government.
II. TRANSOVEREIGNTY
These different versions of political and legal development
provide a basis on which to appreciate the place of transover-
eignty in the international arena. Transovereigns exemplify the
kind of "values-first" approach to political theory that Professor
Dworkin espouses." Whatever "need to organize" is exper-
ienced by the membership of a transovereign, it is clearly
25. See, e.g., id. at 184-222 (discussing possible legitimacy of civil disobedience).
26. The "values-first approach" to political theory seems to be at the foundation of
older natural law-based theories of international law as a whole, such as that of Hugo
Grotius. See, e.g., Huco GROTIUS AND INTERNATMONAL RELATIONS (Hedley Bull et al. eds.,
1990).
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prompted by the urge to further the values-based goals that
brought these people together in the first place.
However, concerning these "needs," one crucial difference
from the earlier models of political development must be noted
at the outset. Although the membership of a transovereign will
face practical problems in becoming organized, one of the diffi-
culties they will not confront is the responsibility of effectively
governing any particular territory. Thus, the move to legiti-
mated "community" can be quick and straightforward, for the
sense of community at work here is moral rather than pragmatic,
and this political entity can therefore be much looser and more
difficult to identify than those ordinarily associated with effective
political action.
To return to the schematic summary of political develop-
ment we have been using, the sequence of factors that might be
at work here, then, could be a simple modification of Professor
Dworkin's model:
sovereignty
through
,,,internal
moral and point of
political need to tran sovereign
- 10 viewvalues organize community
(human rights) obligation
to obey
Yet the difference between transovereigns and ordinary
political communities is greater than this modification suggests.
The depiction above omits an important element in the nature
of transovereigns by leaving the strong, internalized "obligation
to obey" - and hence, the closely allied concept of "authority"
- as a final outcome of the process that produces the organiza-
tion. Transovereigns are instead characterized by a membership
that is committed to the values of the group more deeply and
more quickly than ordinary political development would pro-
duce. Indeed, transovereigns seem to organize because of a sense
of responsibility toward the common values that unite the mem-
bers. Thus, a better picture of the sequence at the foundation of
these entities would be this:
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sovereignty
moral and ",-Xthrough internalS .
political point of view Aneed to transovereign
values nee to organize community(human rights) obligation
to obey
A transovereign, then, has the luxury of being able to act politi-
cally at its very inception from the strength of a pre-existing "inter-
nal point of view" - an authority to speak and act - concerning
the basic purposes of the organization. No effective government
of the membership is actually necessary to keep the organization
vital and politically significant, so long as the underlying values
that formed it remain identifiable and significant to the mem-
bership.
Transovereigns will not, of course, be of a single type or
character, for the underlying factors of "internalization" of val-
ues and "obligation" to follow and participate can vary widely.
The political force they embody, however, is much more than
the occasional attachment people can feel to an interest group
dedicated to a narrow topic. 27 Instead, a transovereign is more
pervasive in its influence - it is an entity that is ultimately recog-
nized by its members or adherents as having the authority to de-
fine basic values themselves, perhaps even the nature of right
and wrong, and then to seek the membership's help in imple-
menting those conclusions. The transovereign's ambition could
reach well beyond regulating the lives of its members; it could
see its mission as spreading the influence of its values to a wider
audience. Indeed, the development of a transovereign can be-
come circular: having come together because of shared values,
the members can allow those values to take on a life of their own
in the form of the transovereign entity, to which the people then
turn for guidance concerning the values that created it.
Transovereigns retain their special, non-traditional charac-
ter, however, only by remaining connected and committed to
the core values that generated them, and only if the members
feel a common bond among themselves in these shared values.
27. Tarlock, supra note 3 at 65 (describing NGO's as example of narrow topic in-
terest group). We have in mind, however, entities both more fundamental and more
ambiguous than the NGO's analyzed by Tarlock.
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With those factors, the result is an identifiable community, often
with significant political power, but one very different from
those assumed by the tenets of international governance.
Transovereignty is therefore a political force that derives a
significant part of its strength from the fact that it exists in a
world of traditional sovereignty. Other political entities of vary-
ing structure, depending on the cultures that produce them,
perform the actual tasks of governing - handling all the
problems and challenges that diverse populations can present,
and that competing versions of justice and order can generate.
Transovereigns can therefore focus their energy on certain val-
ues because they do not ordinarily have to make hard, practical
choices among competing values. They exist because their
memberships have already made those choices, and seek to have
their views implemented within the political frameworks offered
by traditional sovereigns. Or, in extreme cases, they might seek
to replace existing sovereigns with other governments friendlier
to their agenda.
Because transovereigns are therefore parasites on, rather
than examples of, sovereignty, the sequence of factors we have
suggested as behind the formation of transovereigns should not
be understood as an endorsement of Professor Dworkin's polit-
ical and legal theory, even though his values-based model of
political development provides the closest comparison or ana-
logue for them. Traditional sovereigns may or may not have fun-
damental moral and political values at their origin, although the
United States, with its historical background of local covenants,
compacts, and charters, and finally the U.S. Constitution, may be
a good example of what Professor Dworkin has in mind. 8 Nev-
ertheless, one could conclude that if a particular nation-state
had certain identifiable values at its core - that is, if such values
form a perspective from which all its national actions should be
appreciated and interpreted - then that country ought to have
particularly interesting relationships with transovereigns, both
positive and negative. If that nation's underlying values are con-
sistent with those of a particular transovereign, that nation prob-
ably would have a very cozy and cooperative relationship with
the transovereign, since the voices of authority of the govern-
28. See generally DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
13-50 (1988).
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ment and the transovereign should complement and reinforce
each other. On the other hand, if that nation's foundational
values are markedly different from those of a certain transover-
eign, then that nation's government would probably have a
much more tense and competitive relationship with the tran-
sovereign, the voices of authority speaking to the population
now being discordant.
An example could help make these theoretical propositions
real.
III. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AS TRANSOVEREIGN
IN POLAND
During the past fifteen years, the world has witnessed one of
the more obvious exercises of power by a transovereign in con-
flict with a traditional sovereign. This example - the struggle
over the soul of the government of Poland - actually involves
two transovereigns of very different types, one highly structured
and steeped in history and tradition, the other little more than
an idealistic theory. Both, however, exert the force of ideology.
Religious faith is an archetype of the internal point of view
on which transovereignty can be based.29 The Catholic Church
exhibits far more, however, than just the faith of its individual
members - it is an organization with its own laws, dogma, and
rites that establish and clarify membership, and create obedi-
ence without coercive enforcement.30 Moreover, the Catholic
Church has both a history and a tradition of moral leadership
beyond the walls of its churches, extending itself directly into
political struggle from time to time. The Papal Revolution of
29. On the nature and historical significance of faith systems to Western culture
and political structure, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADMITION (1983) [hereinafter LAw AND REVOLUTION]; HAROLD
J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993) [here-
inafter FAITH AND ORDER].
30. The Roman Catholic Church has defined a specific set of values about the
relation between mankind and God, along with the implications of the relationship for
human existence and personal salvation. People have identified with these values and
have ultimately chosen whether they accept the Catholic Church as a legitimate embod-
iment and teacher of those values. Having accepted those values and their manifesta-
tion in the Church as legitimate, the follower defers to the Church, as a transovereign,
in defining particular aspects of those values. Excommunication might be seen as a
form of "coercion," but only in the sense that it impacts negatively someone who has
already voluntarily committed himself or herself to the faith and its values and rites.
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Gregory VII,31 for example, in the Eleventh Century made the
Church's attitude toward politics clear. Rather than continue to
permit local monarchs to influence or determine local Church
matters, Pope Gregory turned the relationship around. The
Pope sought to establish the Church's primacy by claiming for
the Church the swords of both spiritual and temporal power, the
latter being given back to kings by the Church. Thus, the
Church was entitled - indeed, had a duty - to influence polit-
ical events, while political leaders were to keep their hands off
the Church.
This attitude has continued to the present. During the Sec-
ond Vatican Council in Rome, for example, the Church reaf-
firmed its determination to act in the world. Although the
Council reiterated that the Church should not be active in the
traditionally secular realms of politics and economics, it did pro-
claim that its
religious mission can be the source of commitment, direc-
tion, and vigor to establish and consolidate the community of
men according to the law of God. In fact, the Church is able,
indeed it is obliged, if times and circumstances require it, to
initiate action for the benefit of all men, especially of those in
need, like works of mercy and similar undertakings.3 2
As a transovereign, the Church not only has a strong, identi-
fiable policy, it also has a two-tiered system for promulgating its
message. To its members in general it has the pulpit, and to
traditional sovereigns it has the Vatican's diplomatic arm, the
Holy See, which has gained recognition in international contexts
even though it is not considered to represent a state.33
The Church's opposition to communism began almost im-
mediately after that political ideology's appearance. Only six
years after the Communist Manifesto was published, Pope Leo XIII
used strong language to condemn
that sect of men who, under various and almost barbarous
names, are called socialists, communists, or nihilists, and who,
spread over all the world, and bound together by the closest
ties in a wicked confederacy, no longer seek the shelter -of
31. See LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 29, at 23, 94-102.
32. The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, in VATICAN COUNCIL II 942 (Austin
Flannery, O.P. ed., Liturgical Press 1984).
33. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 65-66.
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secret meetings, but, openly and boldly marching forth in the
light of day, strive to bring to a head what they have long
been planning - the overthrow of all civil society whatso-
ever.34
The Church reacted this way because it saw in communism
direct challenges to some of its most basic values: denying the
existence of God and a person's personal relationship with
God;35 promoting or fostering the dissolution of families and
marriage;36 denying the natural right of private property;37 and
denying individual human dignity generally by denying that
each individual has sacred value.38 Because communism put the
state rather than the individual and his or her relationship with
God at its center, the Church attacked communism as an inher-
ent violation of human rights. As Pope John Paul II described
the situation in retrospect:
If we then 'inquire as to the source of this mistaken con-
cept of the nature of the person and the "subjectivity" of soci-
ety, we must reply that its first cause is atheism. It is by re-
sponding to the call of God contained in the being of things
that man becomes aware of his transcendent dignity. Every
individual must give this response, which constitutes the apex
of his humanity, and no social mechanism or collective sub-
ject can substitute for it. The denial of God deprives the per-
son of his foundation, and consequently leads to a reorgani-
zation of the social order without reference to the person's
dignity and responsibility.39
In effect, the Church recognized that communism was, like Ro-
man Catholicism, a transovereign, and that the struggle between
them should therefore be understood as nothing less than the
battle over the soul of mankind.
34. Pope Leo XIII, Quod Apostolici Muneris, (Dec. 28, 1878), reprinted in THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS 1878-1903, at 11 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGrath 1981).
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Pope Leo XII, Rerm Novarum, (May 15, 1891), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCYCLI-
CALS 1878-1903, at 241-44 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGrath 1981). The Church also pro-
claimed that there is a "right of economic initiative."John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,
reprinted in ON SOCIAL CONCERN, at 25 (St. Paul ed. year).
38. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, (May 1, 1991), reprinted in ENCYCLICAL LETTER
OF JOHN PAUL II: ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM, at 20-21 (St.
Paul ed. year).
39. Id. at 21.
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The Church's opposition to communism in Poland was par-
ticularly important because that country's population, despite
the official atheism of the government, had remained almost en-
tirely Catholic and active in their faith.4" The Church's message
about communism, then, served as an unusually strong method
to help the people define their opposition to the government,
not in terms of temporary economic or political concerns, but in
terms of fundamental values. The Church's message was, in es-
sence, that all people are made free by the grace of God, and any
system that denies freedom of conscience is inherently adverse
to God's will and basic human rights. 41 Communism was also
based on economic determinism, which the Church rejected as
fatalistic.42 The Church embraced instead a philosophy in which
people can have a better life through exercise of their free will. 43
Thus, the battle in Poland was archetypically transovereign
in character, for it was at base a contest about the proper rela-
tionship between the individual and sets of fundamental values.
It also concerned the most basic political loyalty - the internal
point of view - of the people. And because it was abstract
rather than pragmatic at its foundation, it was a battle often
waged around symbols rather than specific policy issues.
The single most important symbol was probably the election
of the first Pope of Polish heritage, John Paul II, in 1978. In his
first trip away from Rome, the Pope returned to his homeland in
1979, which represented the first trip to an Eastern European
country by a Roman Pontiff.44 Through him, the Polish Church
was suddenly a direct, personalized competitor with the official
government, for it had as its spokesman a man who was in many
ways a living Christian allegory for the Polish people. Pope John
Paul II had lived under communism, struggled against it, and
through steadfast beliefs had ultimately passed from its control.
And this Pope never backed away from an opportunity to link
the Church with the opposition movement. In his first encycli-
40. Zygmunt Nagorski, A Church Signal To Poles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1984, at A17.
41. PopeJohn Paul XXIII, Pacem in Terris, (Apr. 11, 1963), reprinted in THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICAIS 1958-1981, at 108 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGrath 1981); see also, Pope John
Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, (Mar. 4, 1979), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCVCUCALLS 1958-
1981, at 261 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGrath 1981).
42. Pope Leo XIII, Libertas, (Jun. 20, 1888), reprinted in THE PAPAL ENCVCLICALS
1878-1903, at 169-70 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGrath 1981).
43. Id.
44. John Darnton, 60 Days that Shook Poland, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1980, § 6, at 39.
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cal, the Pope focussed on the importance of the Church in pro-
moting human rights and how totalitarian regimes violated
those rights. 45 Shortly after the Pope's 1979 visit, the Solidarity
labor movement emerged, and John Paul II responded with a
series of encyclicals in the early 1980's endorsing labor unions,
rejecting the theory of class struggle, and even embracing as con-
sistent with Catholic teaching the use of strikes as a means of
securing rights. 46 The Pope's messages often seemed to be di-
rected specifically at his homeland:
Other nations need to reform certain unjust structures,
and in particular their political institutions, in order to replace
corrupt, dictatorial and authoritarian forms of government by
democratic and participatory ones. This is a process which we
hope will spread and grow stronger. For the "health" of a
political community - as expressed in the free and responsi-
ble participation of all citizens in public affairs, in the rule of
law and in respect for the promotion of human rights - is
the necessary condition and sure guarantee of the development of
"the whole individual and of all people."47
After Solidarity was outlawed in December 1981 under the
decree of martial law,48 its leaders, Church leaders in Poland,
and the Polish people continued their efforts to bring about
change, and the Pope maintained his attack.41 John Paul II de-
nounced the actions of the Polish government: "[u]nder the
threat of losing theirjobs, citizens are forced to sign declarations
45. Pope John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, (Mar. 4, 1979), reprinted in THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS 1958-1981, at 260 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGrath 1981).
46. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, (Sept. 14, 1981), reprinted in THE PAPAL
ENCYCLICALS 1958-1981, at 299 (Claudia C. Ihm ed., McGarth 1981). John Paul stated
that popular labor unions were needed to give the people a voice and maintain their
dignity in relation to the government. Id. at 319. He discussed the importance of un-
ions in securing the interests of the workers. Id. at 318-19. He rejected the theory of
class struggle and embraced the use of the strike as a means of securing rights as specifi-
cally in line with Catholic teaching. Id. at 319-20. Later, in Centesimus Annus, Pope
John Paul 11 proclaimed that all have a "right to establish professional associations of
employers and workers, or of workers alone." Centesimus Annus, supra note 38, at 13.
47. John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, reprinted in ON SOCIAL CONCERN, at 84
(Daughters of St. Paul ed., 1987) (emphasis in original).
48. Vladimir Bolshakov, 'Pravda' on Western Reaction to Events in Poland, BBC, Dec.
22, 1981, pt. 1 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File; Despite Crackdown in
Poland, 'The Human Spirit Remains,' U.S. NEws & WORLD RIP., Jan. 25, 1982, at 32.
49. Henry Kamm, Solidarity and Martial Law Bring Church and Poland's Intellectuals
into an Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1982, § 1, at 14.
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that don't agree with their conscience and their convictions. "50
The Pope continued by saying that the violation of conscience
does "grave damage to man" and that "[i]t is the most painful
blow inflicted to human dignity. In a certain sense, it is worse
than inflicting physical death, of killing."51
Shortly thereafter the Pope used his weekly blessing of the
crowd in St. Peter's Square to ask for prayers "for my father-
land."52 He stated: "I want to assure my fellow nationals that
their wishes are mine as well."53 The Pope went on to quote a
pastoral letter issued by Archbishop Josef Glemp, the Primate of
the Polish Church, and the episcopate: "The bishops speak of
the restoration of normal functioning of the state, of the speedy
liberation of all the internees, of an end of pressure for ideologi-
cal reasons and of dismissals from work for people's beliefs or
membership in the union."54 He quoted the bishops: "[i] n the
name of liberty, we believe firmly that the right to organize in
autonomous and self-governed unions must be restored to work-
ers, and to young people the right to organize in associations of
their choice."55 In retrospective comments on the importance of
these statements of support, Lech Walesa, the founder of Soli-
darity, told the Pope: 'You were and are the symbol of the spirit
of this nation, of a nation that never accepted a system of en-
slavement."
The political struggle involved more than just the words of
the Pope, of course. Turmoil erupted, for example, when the
government, under the theory of separation of church and state,
ordered the removal of crucifixes from public buildings and
schools. 7 Mass demonstrations, especially by students, protested
the action, 8 which many found quite predictable. One priest
noted that: "[t]he students are 100 percent Catholic, and this is
50. Pope Denounces Polish Crackdown, N.Y. TIMIs, Jan. 11, 1982, at A9.
51. Id.
52. Henry Kamm, Pope Backs Polish Primate's Call on Human Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
25, 1982, at A8.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Stephen Engelberg, Pope Visits a Non-Communist Poland, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 2,
1991, § 1, at 3.
57. John Kifner, Student Protest Swells in Poland; Return of Crucifixes is Demanded, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 9, 1984, at Al.
58. Id.
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an insult to their religious sensibilities."59 The assault on the
symbols of the Church were quite apparently understood as an
assault on the basic values of the people themselves, and chal-
lenged directly the internal point of view the people had toward
the Church rather than the government. Reverend Stanislaw
Binko put it most succinctly: "There is no Poland without a
cross."
60
Local clergy often used their pulpits to challenge the gov-
ernment, and thus demonstrate that the Church had legitimate
authority to define the issues at stake. For example, when the
Polish government offered jailed Solidarity leaders and other
dissidents their release from prison if they would accept exile
from Poland, Reverend Jerzy Popieluszko preached to a congre-
gation of over 10,000 people that the government had no right
to deny a "man a right to his homeland."6
The Church not only allied itself with the people against the
government, it also became a force in settling political problems
by acting as a mediator between Solidarity and the government.
During a strike by members of the outlawed labor union, the
Polish bishops appointed mediators that facilitated negotiations
between the government and the workers.62 Despite what might
have appeared to be a neutral stance, the head of the striking
workers publicly thanked the bishops for their "support."6 Fur-
thermore, the Church gave the workers the physical means to
continue the strike by delivering food to those who refused to
leave the job-site.' Although the strike ended without a clear
victory for either side, the striking workers left their positions
carrying a wooden cross, pictures of Pope John Paul II, and pic-
tures of the icon of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa, a na-
tional symbol and most holy artifact in Poland.6"
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Polish Priest Defends Solidarity From Pulpit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1983, at A13.
62. John Tagliabue, Poland's Bishops Name 5 Mediators in Labor Conflict, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1988, at Al. This strike protested the Government's raising of food prices as
part of economic reform. The strike in part demonstrates that economic change was
not the only motivation for the revolution in Poland - that freedom to choose one's
own destiny was also central. The Church embodied that message.
63. Id.
64. John Tagliabue, Gdansk Workers End 9-Day; Key Demand Unmet, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1988, at Al.
65. Id.
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The government certainly understood the force that op-
posed it, but could do little more than attempt to cast doubt on
its legitimacy. Prime Minister General WojciechJaruzelski told a
national conference of the Communist Party: "Deep distaste is
aroused by the courting of the church and the misuse of its pres-
tige by various mysteriously 'converted' and morally edified ones
who try to turn the temples into rallying places or exhibition
halls and to ply politics in churches."6 He went on to say that
there were priests who "have confused the pulpit with the Radio
Free Europe microphone." 7 The government occasionally used
more than just words to combat the Church, since several priests
were murdered during this period.68 But in the competition be-
tween the inconsistent sources of moral and, inevitably in Po-
land, political authority, the government found itself left with
only coercion as a means of social control. Having had any
chance of developing an internal point of view blocked by this
transovereign, the government was doomed to eventual failure.
IV. TRANSOVEREIGNTY AND LEGAL ETHICS
The Catholic Church is but an example of the larger phe-
nomenon of transovereignty. If the purpose of this Article were
to prove the existence of such entities and to identify all their
common salient features, it would be necessary to examine in
similar detail the efforts of other purported transovereigns, like
the "Green" movement and Amnesty International and so on, in
other political contexts. But the goals in this Article concerning
transovereignty are necessarily more limited, for there is the ad-
ditional responsibility here to link this discussion of political de-
velopment and authority to the more particular topic of the ethi-
cal responsibilities of lawyers.
This task is either very easy or very difficult. It is easy if the
lawyer's relationship to the transovereign follows the ordinary
66. John Kifner, Polish Leader Assures and Warns the Church, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1984, § 1, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Stephen Engelberg, Evolution in Europe; Figure in Slaying of Polish Priest Hints at
Involvement of Superiors, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1990, § 1, at 6. This point is all the more
dramatic when linked to the rumors that later surfaced of the KGB's possible involve-
ment in the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. Michael Wines, Upheaval in the
East: 1980 Soviet Defector Emerges with an Account of K.G.B. Plots, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990,
§ 1, at 6.
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lawyer-client pattern that is at the heart of traditional Western
legal ethics, and the representation occurs within a recognized
domestic legal system. In that situation, although a lawyer may
have some obstacles to overcome, the usual expectations im-
posed on lawyers by either domestic or emerging international
ethics codes ought to apply without significant complication.
However, relating legal ethics and transovereignty will be quite a
challenge where the traditional form of lawyering is not present
- where either the transovereign is not a "client" in any mean-
ingful sense or the representation has little to do with any legal
system. Legal ethics would apply here only in the form of a gen-
eralized moral code that a legal professional perhaps ought, but
need not necessarily, heed.
Given this basic problem of trying to address a range of pos-
sible scenarios between these extremes, this Article will focus on
connecting legal ethics and transovereignty in relation to three
topics. First, because transovereigns are founded on internal-
ized moral values, Part A below will discuss the tension a lawyer-
member of a transovereign may feel between those values and
the ethical obligations of independence and objectivity that law-
yers are traditionally required to put at the foundation of their
professional relationships and their professional advice. Second,
because traditional legal ethics is based on the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to an identifiable client, Part B will examine the ethical
implications in the areas of conflicts and confidentiality for a law
practice that purports to represent or further transovereign
"causes" rather than the interests of a particular client. Third,
because politically significant transovereigns can form around
any internalized moral values, Part C will discuss whether lawyers
themselves have become a transovereign in their own right due
to the faith they typically place in the rule of law as the most
basic of all governing values.
A. Transovereigns and Lauyer Independence
It is an open question whether lawyering is at its best when it
is passionate or when it is dispassionate. Passion generates en-
thusiasm and unflagging hard work, but it can warp one's per-
spective so much that the advice one gives may become short-
sighted and dangerous - one ends up saying what one wants to
say rather than what one should. Dispassion helps keep a lawyer
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focused on the client's agenda rather than confusing or conflat-
ing it with his or her own, which will help guarantee that bad or
unwelcome news will be delivered when it should; on the other
hand, the lack of personal commitment to a client's interests
may disguise a lawyer's unspoken commitment to other social
interests in competition with the client's.
American legal ethics codes69 have almost nothing to say
about passion, although they certainly expect lawyers to be "zeal-
ous"7 in their representation of their clients and single-minded
and undistracted in their advice to their clients.71 The implica-
tion, then, is that devotion to a client's values is probably consis-
tent, rather than inconsistent, with appropriate legal representa-
tion. The codes do acknowledge that dangers can arise to a cli-
ent's interests that stem from a lawyer's own personal interests,
but these are understood as interests that might pull the lawyer
away from, rather than toward, the client., For example, the
ABA's Model Rules admonish lawyers to avoid representations in
which "the lawyer's own personal interests" may "materially
limit" the representation.72 The Comments to this Rule, as well
as its context, make clear that the drafters had in mind an inter-
est adverse to the client's, not an interest in apparent harmony
with the client's.7 3 Likewise, the ABA's older Model Code re-
69. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES).
70. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at Canon 7. Canon 7, for example, admonishes
lawyers to "represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law," an idea then
repeated in Ethical Consideration ("EC") 7-1. Id. The MODEL RULES more moderately
require a lawyer to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client." MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.3, but the Rules then go on to note that
"[a] lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule
1.3, cmt. [1].
71. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 5-101, 5-105, 5-107;
MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.7, 1.9.
72. MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.7(b).
73. Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.7 reads:
[t]he lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on
representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should
not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently
and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a lawyer's own
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible
for a lawyer to give a client detached advice. A lawyer may not allow related
business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to
an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.
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quires lawyers to decline a representation where "the exercise of
[their] professional judgment on behalf of [their] clients will be
or reasonably may be affected by [their] own... personal inter-
ests," 74 those interests being fUrther generally described as "com-
promising influences and loyalties." 75
The same general approach seems to be behind one exam-
ple of an international legal ethics code: the Code of Conduct
for Lawyers in the European Community.76 The first of the
"General Principles" it lists as a basic value reflected in the Code
is "Independence,"" and because the Code's language implies
other considerations to which this Article turns in a moment, the
relevant section is worth quoting in full:
2.1.1 The many duties to which a lawyer is subject re-
quire his absolute independence, free from all other influ-
ence, especially such as may arise from his personal interests
or external pressure. Such independence is as necessary to
trust in the process ofjustice as the impartiality of the judge.
A lawyer must therefore avoid any impairment of his indepen-
dence and be careful not to compromise his professional
standards in order to please his client, the court or third par-
78ties.
Note that the second sentence relates independence to imparti-
ality, suggesting that a passionate commitment to a client's cause
may not be professionally healthy. In other words, the kind of
independence this section has in mind seems to include a form
of dispassionate objectivity - specifically, objectivity required by
the "process of justice" rather than the client's immediate goals.
This impression is reinforced by the third sentence which differ-
entiates a lawyer's "professional standards" from merely pleasing
the client.
Similar admonitions in the American ethics codes also re-
quire lawyers to place any client's interests within the prior, and
controlling, context of the judicial system in which they are be-
MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.7, cmt. 6.
74. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 5-101 (A).
75. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at, EC 5-1 (emphasis added).
76. EC CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 4.
77. Id. at Rule 2.1.
78. Id. at Rule 2.1.1.
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ing pursued. 9 This perspective, along with that of the EC Code,
reflects the underlying fundamental principle of legal ethics that
lawyers have a fiduciary responsibility to their clients."0
Although the full substance and practical details of this responsi-
bility cannot easily be articulated, its basis in the client's depen-
dence on the lawyer's professional expertise - the client's vul-
nerability in the legal realm - suggests that part of this duty
must be some measure of distance between lawyer and client
that allows the lawyer to add a perspective to the situation that
the client cannot easily supply itself.
For lawyers who represent transovereigns, this may present a
problem worth considering. By definition, transovereigns gener-
ate the passion of commitment - their members have internal-
ized and now act upon the values the transovereign embodies.
Lawyer-members of these transovereigns, then, when acting in
their professional capacities on behalf of the transovereign, face
the challenge of tempering their commitment with objectivity.
In turn, this may be more than an internal, personal struggle, for
other members of the group may find a perspective based in ob-
jectivity to be inconsistent with the transovereign's values and
agenda. Pressure might then be put on the lawyer to conform
professionally as well as personally.
A second, related concern for lawyer-members is that they
must recognize that the transovereign is not merely a particu-
larly pushy or demanding client."1 If lawyer-members internalize
the values of the transovereign, then these values become a sepa-
rate, significant source of authority in their lives, perhaps even a
source strong enough to challenge the basic values embodied in
the laws and legal system of the jurisdiction in which they prac-
tice. In that circumstance, the urge or tendency to give less than
fully reflective and objective advice will be particularly strong.
B. Transovereigns as Clients: Conflicts and Confidentiality
The strength of the moral pull on the lawyer-member of a
transovereign also raises a cluster of related ethical concerns.
79. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 69 at pmbl., 1, Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE,
supra note 69 at EC 7-1, 7-19-39, DR 7-102.
80. See CRARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHiCS 145-48 (1986)..
81. Timothy Terrell et al., Rethinking "Professionalism," 41 EMORY L. J. 403, 414-15
(1992) (discussing special modern problem that client dominance of lawyers has be-
come).
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The most obvious are those involving conflicts between the inter-
ests of the transovereign and the interests of others to whom the
lawyer may owe some duty, and those involving confidentiality of
information obtained in the course of assisting a transovereign
in pursuing its goals. Both of these, however, are largely a func-
tion of the more basic issue of identifying exactly who the client
is in this human rights context.
Identifying the client is a critical initial issue, of course, be-
cause virtually all other aspects of legal ethics flow from it. As
cynics would like to put it, lawyers need clients in order to trans-
form themselves from "merely" bad persons into bad lawyers. And
because client service is the essence of a traditional law practice,
identifying the client is not usually a serious challenge.
Problems most frequently arise when the lawyer attempts to
serve more than one client regarding a common matter. In
these circumstances, keeping straight in one's mind exactly who
the client is - who is entitled to the lawyer's loyalty, diligence,
and so on - is the lawyer's principal method for avoiding
trouble.
Imagine, for example, a lawyer who is asked by Amnesty In-
ternational ("AI") to assist a particular prisoner in a country that
Al believes to have a government involved in widespread human
rights violations. Once the lawyer becomes involved, however,
she learns that a unique and narrow legal avenue is available that
will likely lead to this prisoner's release, but to the release of no
one else, and that this legal technique has nothing to do with the
wider legal and social conditions that caused this and other pris-
oners to be incarcerated in the first place in the conditions they
are now enduring. Yet the lawyer also knows that AI is counting
heavily on the publicity concerning this prisoner to provoke im-
portant world reaction against the actions and policies of the in-
carcerating government. Any debate about the lawyer's ethical
duty here would have to turn on some confusion about the iden-
tity of the client. Under American legal ethical principles, the
lawyer either has a single client - the prisoner - although her
fee may be being paid by a third party (AI), or the lawyer has two
clients whose interests now conflict, forcing the lawyer to choose
between them or withdraw altogether.8 2 In either event, if the
82. See MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.7; MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR
5-105.
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prisoner is a client, then it would be inappropriate under stan-
dard rules of confidentiality for the lawyer even to inform Al of
the unusual legal avenue she has discovered while working on
behalf of the prisoner, unless the prisoner gives his consent for
her to do so.
8 3
The only factor that makes this scenario interesting is the
one discussed earlier: the special, separate loyalty the lawyer
may feel toward the transovereign that has as its agenda issues of
much greater moment than the circumstances of one individual
who might appear to be the lawyer's client. The lawyer is forced
to choose, then, between the authority of the principles of legal
ethics and the authority of the moral imperative of alleviating
human rights abuses - one is supposed to guide her as a profes-
sional, the other as a human being. As an additional difficulty,
legal ethics would not necessarily permit the lawyer to make this
choice in private. If the lawyer is honest enough with herself to
recognize the conflict she faces, but she nevertheless believes
her representation of the client or clients will be unaffected,
American legal ethics would require her to reveal the conflict to
the parties involved.8 4
The situation is murkier and less obvious, but still the same,
in the circumstance in which the transovereign is not an identifi-
able organization, but a movement of like-minded individuals. If
the values of this movement - protecting some aspect of the
environment, advancing some form of religion, whatever - are
a strong source of moral authority for the lawyer, the lawyer
must recognize and reveal to any affected clients the internal
conflict this competing loyalty creates.
C. The Cult of Lawyering as a Transovereignty
It is not easy to determine which organizations or move-
ments are appropriately given the transovereignty label. The key
83. MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 4-
101. The information developed by the lawyer in the course of representing the pris-
oner would be confidential information protected by ethical responsibilities not to dis-
close it without the client's consent. MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.6; MODEL
CODE, supra note 69, at DR 4-101.
84. MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at Rule 1.7; MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 5-
105(C). The revelation is necessary because the representation in this circumstance
can only continue with the client's informed consent. MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at
Rule 1.7; MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 5-105(C).
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here is substance, not form. A transovereign is any entity,
whatever, structure it may have or not have, that embodies im-
portant moral and political values that function as a strong guide
for the behavior of its members or adherents. Given this de-
scription, lawyers themselves, because of similarities in their sys-
tematic training, their shared belief in certain core values and
their important social function, may have become a kind of tran-
sovereign all their own.
Lawyers are naturally committed to several key principles
that they would probably classify as pragmatic rather than moral:
order, rationality, consistency, impartiality, and similar concepts
that are the usual characteristics of traditional legal systems.
The emphasis here is on "system" - lawyers by training and ex-
perience, and usually by preexisting inclination, have no interest
in the unpredictability of either anarchy or unfettered power,
but are instead drawn to social patterns and forms that will make
lawyers useful, and hence powerful. One label for this favorable
state of affairs is "the rule of law," by which is usually meant sys-
tematic, institutionalized social control that will depend in part
on expert guides, rather than control through occasional, ran-
dom, self-serving edicts that will reward luck as much as ability.
Lawyers can be counted on to oppose and resist instability in
favor of stability, to reform disorganization into structure, to
squeeze order out of chaos.
Lawyers do so with the faith that the systems they create that
benefit them benefit society even more. Thus, the argument here
is not that a lawyer's devotion to the establishment and preserva-
tion of the rule of law is merely based in self-aggrandizement, a
thirst for power, greed, or anything of that kind. Instead, lawyers
have accepted and internalized the basic moral values that order
and stability themselves represent. For lawyers, then, order car-
ries its own moral authority, an authority that does not need
elaborate, continuing justification. And as that subtle authority
motivates lawyers to protect the systems in which they practice,
and to help other communities develop the stability in which
lawyers can operate to be of service to those communities, law-
yers have quietly but successfully formed a transovereign move-
ment of international significance.8"
85. One interesting example is the massive effort mounted by the American Bar
Association over the last few years to supply legal assistance to groups in Eastern Euro-
TRANSOVEREIGNTY
The importance of this legal transovereign is as subtle as its
underlying authority. As believers in order and structure, law-
yers are usually a strong voice in any community against violent,
sudden, uncontrolled change. They do not necessarily oppose
change itself, just certain techniques by which it might be accom-
plished. Lawyers are therefore a force of moderation and reflec-
tion in circumstances in which those values are often dis-
counted. 6 They might then be understood, perhaps, as a tran-
sovereign dedicated to blunting the power of other
transovereigns that would seek more immediate and dramatic
success in their aims. In fact, lawyer-members within these other
transovereigns may act as a subversive internal counterweight
tempering the actions of such entities. One can legitimately
wonder, therefore, whether lawyers in this situation are acting
under the cloud of what would otherwise be labeled an "unethi-
cal" conflict of interest.8 7
Lawyering, like transovereignty, is therefore a more intrigu-
ing phenomenon than most seem to assume or realize. The gen-
eral public in this country, with its well-known penchant for law-
yer-bashing, has apparently sensed some of the implications of
the cultishness of the profession even if the profession has not.
In fact, much of the criticism directed at lawyers seems to involve
instances of failure to live up to the implicit values of order and
structure - rather than greed and power - that lie at the heart
of the profession.
pean countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union involved in drafting new
constitutions: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE (CEELI LAwv PROJECT)
(American Bar Association Project ed., 1993). See Ken Myers, East-West Scholar Coopera-
tion Becoming a Booming Business, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 15, 1992, at 4 (discussing CEELI pro-
ject).
86. Another interesting aspect of the legal transovereign movement is the creation
of organizations of lawyers focused on helping to free lawyers in other countries who
have been incarcerated because of their activities on behalf of human rights or estab-
lishing the rule of law. The best known of these groups is the Lawyer-to-Lawyer Net-
work, which is an adjunct of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. LAWYER-TO-
LAWYER NETWORK (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, ed. 1994)
87. The inclination of lawyers as a group toward procedural values, like consis-
tency, stability, and political participation, rather than substantive values, like freedom
of sexual preference, gun control, or abortion, reflects the simple fact that the human
rights ideologies of the transovereigns and other groups of which lawyers may be mem-
bers are often in conflict. A lawyer's "internal point of view" is ordinarily therefore
pulled in several different directions, the only clear common ground among them be-
ing the basic procedural values.
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CONCLUSION
This Article introduces and skims the surface of the concept
of transovereignty and its possible implications for legal ethics in
the international arena. The purpose has been to suggest a dif-
ferent perspective from which international lawyering, particu-
larly involving organizations dedicated to human rights activities,
might be assessed. Although no specific conclusions have been
reached about any particular rules or circumstances of legal eth-
ics that must now be overhauled or reformed in light of the in-
fluence of transovereigns of which lawyers might be members,
perhaps this effort has provided a basis for further discussion
that might yield the more fulsome guidance that practicing law-
yers deserve.
